

Message Text

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ACTION PM-03

INFO OCT-01 NEA-09 ISO-00 AID-05 IGA-01 CIAE-00 INR-07

NSAE-00 RSC-01 MC-01 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 EUR-12 L-02

/064 W

----- 022995

R 301342Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

TO CDR USAMICOM REDSTONE ARS AL//AMCPM-KMS//

INFO DA WASHDC//DALI-ILS//

SECDEF WASHDC//ISA(SA)/DSAA//

SECSTATE WASHDC 1823

USCINCEUR//ECJ4/7-SAOCD//

CDR AMC ALEX VA//AMCIL-O/MA//

DA (COE) WASHDC//DAEN-MCC-G//

CDR TRADOC FT MONROE VA//ATTNG-PRP-FMT//

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 KUWAIT 5515

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS KU

SUBJ: FMS CASE DA UAH KUWAIT (IHAWK)

REF: A. USAMICOM 162130Z DEC 74

B. KUWAIT 4379 DTG 100638Z OCT 74

C. KUWAIT 3934 DTG 160751Z SEP 74

D. KUWAIT 5222 DTG 041203Z DEC 74

1. REF A HAS POSED A NUMBER OF VERY PENETRATING AND PERTINENT QUESTIONS. WE WELCOME THE FORMATION OF A PROVISIONAL PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OFFICE AND STRONGLY SUPPORT ITS BEING ESTABLISHED AS A DA CHARTERED PROJECT WITH AUTHORITY OVER ALL ARMY COGNIZANCE KUWAIT FMS MATTERS.

2. KUWAIT HAS LAUNCHED UPON A MAJOR MODERNIZATION OF ITS ARMED FORCES WITH FIRST PRIORITY BEING GIVEN TO THE AIR FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE IN PARTICULAR. THIS PROGRAM HAS THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE AMIR AS WELL AS THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND THE GOVERNMENT.

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US 1.4 BILLION HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR THE OVERALL MODERNIZATION

PLAN. REGRETFULLY THEIR PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES AND TECHNICALLY SKILLED MANPOWER RESOURCES ARE FAR LESS THAN THEIR FINANCIAL RESOURCES. KUWAIT HAS ATTEMPTED TO ACCOMPLISH THE PLANNING ETC. ON A PIECEMEAL BASIS WITH SOME MAJOR PROCUREMENTS GOING TO VARIOUS COUNTRIES FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

3. THE KUWAIT AIR FORCE (WHICH HAS THE ENTIRE AIR DEFENSE MISSION) CURRENTLY HAS ABOUT 70 AIRCRAFT OF 11 TYPES (US, UK, FR) AND 800-1000 MEN TOTAL, OF WHOM ABOUT HALF HAVE BEEN IN UNIFORM FOR ONE YEAR OR LESS. WITHIN TWO YEARS IT WILL NEED TO EXPAND TO ABOUT 5000 (DOD REP ESTIMATE) TO ACCOMMODATE TWO NEW HELICOPTER SQUADRONS (AIRCRAFT NOW ARRIVING), TWO NEW AIRCRAFT SQUADRONS (US A-4'S), A BATTALION PLUS OF IHAWK AND AN AIR CONTROL SYSTEM. THE KAF HEADQUARTERS CURRENTLY HAS TEN OFFICERS PLUS TWO PROFESSIONAL LEVEL CIVILIANS TO RUN BOTH DAY TO DAY OPERATIONS PLUS THEIR MODERNIZATION/EXPANSION PROGRAM.

4. ON THE AIR DEFENSE/IHAWK, THE GOK HAS REQUESTED AND RECEIVED ADVICE FROM EGYPT. A TEAM OF EGYPTIAN ARMY OFFICERS REVIEWS ALL PLANS, ETC., HOWEVER, THEY ARE NOT RESIDENT IN KUWAIT. THE PROFESSIONAL CALIBER OF THIS TEAM IS IMPRESSIVE BUT THEIR AVAILABILITY IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WITH POSTPONEMENTS ETC. FROM AGREED UPON DATES NOT UNUSUAL.

5. ON THE KUWAITI SIDE, THEIR ONLY FULL TIME OFFICER ON THE PROJECT IS A 1ST LT (WHO IS SLATED TO GO TO CONUS ASAP FOR TRAINING) UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE VICE COMMANDER OF THE AIR FORCE. ALSO, DECISION MAKING AUTHORITY IS GENERALLY RESERVED TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE PERSONALLY. THIS SITUATION DOES NOT LEND ITSELF TO EXPEDITIOUS DECISION MAKING.

6. PRESENTLY AMEMB KUWAIT HAS TWO US MILITARY OFFICERS TO HANDLE THE FOREGOING PLUS OTHER FMS CASES AMOUNTING TO TWO A-4 SQUADRONS, REEQUIPPING THE KUWAIT ARMED FORCES WITH AUTOMOTIVE/ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT; INTRODUCTION OF THE TOW MISSILE AND OTHER ASSOCIATED SMALLER PRLGRAMS. SINCE THE GOK MADE THEIR BIG DECISION IN NOV ON THE IHAWK AND A-4 PROGRAMS, WE HAVE BEEN INUNDATED WITH ADDITIONAL REQUESTS FOR EVERYTHING FROM MAGAZINES TO SHIPS.

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7. UNLIKE MOST OTHER COUNTRIES WHERE THERE ARE SIZEABLE US MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, KUWAIT HAS NO LONG EXPERIENCE WITH USG WAYS OF DOING BUSINESS. SUCH COUNTRIES AS IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA WITH THEIR LARGE FMS PROGRAMS LEARNED TO DEAL WITH THE USG OVER MANY YEARS (IRAN SINCE 1946, SAUDI SINCE 1951) WHEN THE USG WAS PAYING THE BILL (MAP GRANT AID). THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A US GRANT AID OR EVEN AN FMS CREDIT PROGRAM IN KUWAIT. TO DATE, THERE HAS BEEN ONLY ONE DELIVERY (TOW MISSILE) UNDER ANY

OF THE PROGRAMS THEY HAVE AGREED TO. WHILE THEY ARE LEARNING, THEY DO NOT UNDERSTAND OUR PROCEDURES, AND DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY WE CANNOT BE MORE FLEXIBLE AT TIMES, PARTICULARLY ON COSTS OF SURVEYS PRELIMINARY TO MAJOR PROJECTS.

8. THE FOLLOWING SUBPARAGRAPHS ARE SPECIFICALLY KEYED TO REF A:

A. THE TRAINING CONCEPT ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY RAYTHEON STILL REPRESENTS THE DESIRES OF THE GOK WITH MINOR EXCEPTIONS. THE GOK ALSO MAINTAINS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES THAT IT IS WITHIN THEIR CAPABILITY. IN ADDITION TO THE APPROXIMATELY 700 REQUIRED FOR INPUT INTO IHAWK THE A-4 PROGRAM REQUIRES APPROXIMATELY 400 PERSONNEL OF THE SAME BACKGROUND/ABILITY IN THE SAME TIME FRAME. IT IS THE DOD REPS' OPINION THAT ONLY HALF OF THE TOTAL WILL BE AVAILABLE IF EDUCATIONAL STANDARDS ARE MAINTAINED. REF B HAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED SOME INTERESTING INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT. MINOR CHANGES IN THE TRAINING PROGRAM CONSIST OF THE DESIRE OF THE GOK TO: (1) SEND FOUR OFFICERS (ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING NOT REQUIRED) TO ELECTRONICS SCHOOL AND (2) SEND THREE FIELD GRADE OFFICERS (2 OF WHOM WILL REQUIRE ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING) TO AIR DEF OFFS COURSE AND ARMY CGSC (OR USMC C AND S) BOTH AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. REFS C (NUMBER INCREASED LATER) AND D APPLY. LOCALLY, WE CONSIDER GETTING THESE OFFICERS STRATED AND THROUGH TRAINING, SO THAT THEY CAN BE USEFUL IN THE YEAR PRIOR TO MOVEMENT OF THE FIRST BATTERY TO KUWAIT, OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE. THESE WILL BE THE MAINTENANCE OFFICERS AND THE KEY COMMAND AND STAFF OFFICERS FOR THE KUWAITI AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. UNTIL THEY ARE TRAINED THERE WILL BE NO EXPERTISE ON THE SYSTEM WHATSOEVER WITHIN THE KUWAIT AIR FORCE.

B. THE AIR DEFENSE HQ AND TRAINING SCHOOL CONCEPT APPEARS TO HAVE UNDERGONE SOME CHANGES. THE GOK HAS REQUESTED AND THE USG HAS AGREED INFORMALLY TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE
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INFO OCT-01 NEA-09 ISO-00 AID-05 IGA-01 CIAE-00 INR-07

NSAE-00 RSC-01 MC-01 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 EUR-12 L-02

/064 W

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R 301342Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

TO CDR USAMICOM REDSTONE ARS AL//AMCPM-KMS//

INFO DA WASHDC//DALO-ILS//

SECDEF WASHDC//ISA(SA)/DSAA//

SECSTATE WASHDC 1824

USCINCEUR //ECJ4/7-SAOCD//

CDR AMC ALEX VA//AMCIL-O/MA//

DA(COE) WASHDC//DAEN-MCC-G//

CDR TRADOC FT MONROE VA//ATTNG-PRP-FMT//

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IN ESTABLISHING A MILITARY TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTER WHICH WOULD HAVE THE MISSION OF PROVIDING A GRADUATE QUALIFIED TO ENTER US/UK BASIC LEVEL TECHNICAL TRAINING COURSES WITHOUT FURTHER TRAINING OF ANY KIND. WITH THIS FACILITY IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE THAT AN ADDITIONAL SCHOOL TO TAKE THE OUTPUT AND DO THE EQUIVALENT OF THE US ARMY BASIC LEVEL WOULD BE COST EFFECTIVE. NEVERTHELESS, THIS REMAINS THE FORMAL POSITION. IT IS THE DOD REP'S OPINION THAT THEY WOULD BE BETTER ADVISED TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF TRAINING IN THE MILITARY TECHNICAL TRAINING CENTER TO INCLUDE BASIC ELECTRONICS, RADIO REPAIR, GASOLINE ENGINE REPAIR, ETC, AND SEND BASIC TECHNICIANS TO CONUS FOR TRAINING ON SPECIFIC EQUIPMENTS E.G. AN/TRC 145 ETC. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE GOK WOULD BE MOST AMENABLE TO OUR RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE MATTER. IT MUST BE REMEMBERED, HOWEVER, THAT ONLY AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE EXISTS FOR THE TRAINING CENTER; THERE IS NO FIRM COMMITMENT FOR THE USG TO ACTUALLY DO THE JOB.

C. CONCUR WITH YOUR PROPOSAL.
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D. IT IS OUR BELIEF THAT THE GOK STILL DESIRES THE CONCEPT STATED IN THE ORIGINAL RAYTHEON PROPOSAL. THE GOK INSISTS THAT ALL HAWK BATTERY EQUIPMENT BE TRAILER MOUNTED VICE TRUCKS. WE BELIEVE THEY WOULD NOT BE ADAMANT ON THE MAINTENANCE EQUIPMENT. YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ARE SOLICITED.

E. FOR OTHER THAN VEHICLE REPAIRS, FM CAPABILITY IS DEFINITELY DESIRED. THE GOK RESPONSE TO INCLUDING AN AUTOMOTIVE CAPABILITY

WAS NEGATIVE HOWEVER. DOD REP IS OF THE OPINION THAT GOK HAS NOT ADEQUATELY CONSIDERED THE NUMBER OF VEHICLES INVOLVED. A 3RD ECHELON AUTOMOTIVE CAPABILITY IS RECOMMENDED. GOK HAS AN ADEQUATE ENGINE REBUILD FACILITY. AVAILABILITY OF 4/5TH ECHELON CAPABILITY FOR ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS, TRANSMISSION, ETC, IS NOT KNOWN.

F. DUE TO LACK OF DETAILED KNOWLEDGE ON THESE EQUIPMENTS BY BOTH GOK AND DOD REP, WE CANNOT PROVIDE ANY USEFUL INFORMATION. YOUR BEST JUDGEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS WILL PROBABLY BE ACCEPTED BY THE GOK WITHOUT QUESTION.

G. WHILE THE GOK DEFINITELY DESIRES A CALIBRATION FACILITY TO SUPPORT THEIR OWN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM, THEY HAVE ONLY VAGUE IDEAS OF WHAT IS REQUIRED. ALSO, THERE IS PRESENTLY NO CALIBRATION FACILITY IN KUWAIT. CURRENTLY EQUIPMENT REQUIRING CALIBRATION (OR REPAIR) OF ANY COMPLEXITY/ACCURACY IS SHIPPED TO THE UK. STAFF OFFICERS ESTIMATE THAT ONE THIRD IS INOPERATIVE WHEN IT GETS BACK DUE TO ROUGH HANDLING, AND THAT THE TIME RESPONSE IS QUOTE FOREVER UNQUOTE. IF NOT TOO DIFFICULT, TWO ALTERNATIVES SHOULD BE PRESENTED:

(1) A CALIBRATION FACILITY ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THEIR ENTIRE AIR FORCE (1 HELO SQUADRONS, 2 ATTACK SQUADRONS, 1 FIGHTER SQUADRON, 4 IHAWK BATTERIES, PLUS AN/TPS-32 AND AN/TSQ-73. ALL WITH ASSORTED COMM EQUIPMENT, ETC.)

(2) NATIONAL STANDARDIZATION LABORATORY.
OUR ESTIMATE IS THAT THEY WILL OPT FOR THE LATTER.

H. MOBILITY CONCEPT FOR THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (IHAWK, TSQ-73 AND TPS-32) IS THAT THEY EQUIPMENT SHALL BE TRAILER MOUNTED, READY FOR MINIMUM NOTICE DISPLACEMENT TO ALTERNATE SITES. NORMAL OPERATION WILL BE AT RELATIVELY WELL IMPORVED PERMANENT
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SITES. GOK DEMANDS THAT IBBCC BE TRAILER MOUNTED. MOUNTING FOR AN/TRC-145 UNITS HAS NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED. BELIEVE GOK CAN BE FLEXIBLE ON THIS MATTER.

I. AS STATED EARLIER, GOK HAS ATTEMPTED TO PIECEMEAL THEIR MODERNIZATION EFFORT. INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED (THIS MAY CHANGE) NOR SHOULD INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT (SEE CASE UCL); THE MATTER OF OTHER EQUIPMENT HAS NOT BEEN ADDRESSED.

J. GOK ARMED FORCES, IN GENERAL, DO NOT APPRECIATE THE PROBLEMS OF SYSTEM INTEGRATION. THEY ASSUME THAT ALL THE PIECES WILL FIT TOGETHER AND WORK-THE FIRST TIME. THEIR BACKGROUND IN SUCH MATTERS IS LIMITED TO RELATIVELY WELL KNOWN CONVENTIONAL TECTICAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS. GOK WILL DEFINITELY EXPECT USG TO MAKE IT ALL WORK.

9. ADDITIONAL ITEMS NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED IN PARA 8 ABOVE
(OR APPLYING TO MORE THAN ONE ITEM.)

A. TROOP BILLETING-NO POLICY ON TROOP BILLETING AT HAWK/
CSMF/TSQ-73/TPS-32 SITES HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED, I.E. ARE LIVING
QUARTERS (BACHELOR, MARRIED?) RECREATIONAL FACILITIES, ETC.
TO BE INCLUDED?

B. SITE LOCATIONS-DEFINITE SITE LOCATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN
REVEALED (WE DON'T THINK THEY ARE REALLY FIRM) ALTHOUGH THEY
HAVE SEVERAL STUDIES, ETC. TO CHOOSE FROM . THIS HAS A MAJOR
IMPACT ON ROADS, WATER, SEWAGE, ELECTRICITY, ETC.

C. NATURE OF CONSTRUCTION-BASIC POLICY ON AMOUNT OF PASSIVE
PROTECTION AT PERMANENT SITES HAS NOT BEEN DECIDED. DOD REP HAS
RECOMMENDED DRIVE-IN REVETMENTS AS CONSISTENT WITH THEIR HEAVY
RELIANCE ON THEIR AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM.

10. OTHER ITEMS WHICH MAY IMPACT UPON THE PROGRAM:

A. JOINT OPERATIONAL CENTER-THE GOK RECOGNIZES THAT A JOC
WILL BE REQUIRED TO EFFECTIVELY COMMAND THEIR MILITARY FORCES AND
COORDINATE CIVIL EMERGENCY AGENCIES (POLICE, FIRE DEPARTMENT AND
CIVIL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL). AT PRESENT THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY
MILITARY COMMAND CENTER OF ANY DESCRIPTION. IT IS BELIEVED THAT
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THEY ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARDS THE USG DOING THE JOB.
ALSO, SINCE A LETTER OF OFFER WAS ONCE PRESENTED,

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ACTION PM-03

INFO OCT-01 NEA-09 ISO-00 AID-05 IGA-01 CIAE-00 INR-07

NSAE-00 RSC-01 MC-01 NSC-05 SP-02 SS-15 EUR-12 L-02

/064 W

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R 301342Z DEC 74

FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

TO CDR USAMICOM REDSTONE ARS AL//AMCPM-KMS//

INFO DA WASHDC//DALO-ILS//

SECDEF WASHDC//ISA(SA)/DSAA//

SECSTATE WASHDC 1825

USCINC//ECJ4/7-SAOCD//

CDR AMC ALEX VA//AMCIL-O/MA//

DA(COE) WASHDC//DAEN-MCC-G//

CDR TRADOC FT MONROE VA//ATTNG-PRP-FMT//

C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION 3 OF 3 KUWAIT 5515

WE ASSUME THAT THE USG IS WILLING TO DO THE JOB. AT PRESENT,
THE JOC IS NOT SUFFICIENTLY DEFINED TO PROCEED.

B. SUPPLY SYSTEM- CURRENTLY, THE AIR FORCE HAS A MANUAL
SUPPLY SYSTEM STOCKING BETWEEN 60 AND 70,000 LINE ITEMS IN ONE
SUPPLY POINT. IT IS ON THE VERGE OF TOTAL BREAKDOWN. IHAWK AND
THE A-4 CAN BE EXPECTED TO ADD ABOUT 50,000 LINE ITEMS. THE ARMY
HAS ABOUT 110,000 LINE ITEMS, AGAIN WITH A MANUAL SYSTEM. WHEN
MORE DETAILS ON THE ARMY SUPPLY PICTURE ARE ACQUIRED, IT IS OUR
INTENT TO RECOMMEND TO THE GOK A TWO STEP PROCESS TO
(1) DEFINE IN DETAIL SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND (2) ESTABLISH A
COMPUTERIZED SUPPLY SYSTEM WITH TOW ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL COM-
PUTER CENTERS SO THAT EACH COULD BE THE BACK UP FOR THE OTHER.

C. ORGANIZATION- THE KUWAIT AIR FORCE CURRENTLY HAS A HQ
AND 5 SMALL AIRCRAFT QUADRONS. THEY DO NOT HAVE A CLEAR CONCEPT
FOR COMMAND OF AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM ALTHOUGH THERE IS GENERAL
ACCEPTANCE THAT SOMETHING OF THE NATURE OF A BATTALION (AIR
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DEF) HQ WILL BE REQUIRED. ALSO, THE KAF DOES NOT HAVE TOE OR
SIMILAR MANNING DOCUMENT NOR A PERSONNEL (MOS) SYSTEM.
PERSONNEL ARE CATEGORIZED AS OFFICERS (PILOT, ENGINEER, GENERAL),
NCO (ORDINARY, TECHNICAL) OR SOLDIERS (ORDINARY, TECHNICAL).

11. IN ALL PLANNING, ETC, FOR INTRODUCTION OF THIS SYSTEM,
THE FOLLOWING ARE CONSIDERED TO BE GUIDELINES WHICH SHOULD
BE FOLLOWED:

A. ONLY THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM OF DECISION (BY THE KUWAITIS)
SHOULD BE REQUIRED.

B. THESE DECISIONS SHOULD BE BASIC AND SIMPLY STATED E.G.
WILL THE TROOPS LIVE AT THE HAWK SITES?

C. WHENEVER POSSIBLE HAVE A SIMPLE RECOMMENDATION POSITIVELY STATED E.G. WE RECOMMEND A NATIONAL STANDARDIZATION LABORATORY.

D. PRESENT A COMPLETE PACKAGE WHENEVER POSSIBLE. THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE IHAWK LOA WITHOUT THE TRAINING AND FACILITIES PORTIONS BEING FULLY DEFINED WAS A MAJOR EXCEPTION TO THEIR WAY OF DOING THINGS. THE REMAINDER SHOULD FIT THE FRAMEWORK OF ANNEX A TO THE LOA.

E. CLEARLY SPECIFY WHAT ACTIONS/INFORMATION IS REQUIRED FROM THE KUWAITIS AND WHEN.
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Message Attributes

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